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Abstract—An argument is seen as reason in favour of a claim.
It is made of three parts: a set of premises representing the
reason, a conclusion representing the supported claim, and a
connection showing how the premises lead to the conclusion.
Arguments are frequently exchanged by human agents in
natural language (spoken or written) in discussion, debate,
negotiation, persuasion, etc. They may be very different in
that their three components may have various forms.
In this paper, we propose a language for representing such
arguments. We show that it is general enough to capture the
various forms of arguments encountered in natural language,
and that it is possible to represent attack and support relations
between arguments as formulas of the same language.
Keywords-Arguments; Representation language.
I. INTRODUCTION
An argument gives reason to support a claim that is
questionable, or open to doubt. It is made of three parts:
a set of premises representing the reason, a conclusion
representing the supported claim, and a link showing how
the premises lead to the conclusion [14]. The link is hence
the logical part of an argument. The notion of argument is
very rich and complex. Indeed, the reason (respectively the
conclusion) varies from simple statements to combinations
of arguments, and the link may be deductive, abductive,
inductive, . . . [4]. Let us consider the following example
of a natural language argument.
Example 1: The title and first two paragraphs from an
article on whether the London Heathrow airport should be
expanded with a third runway. The article comes from the
BBC website 1.
〈claim〉 Heathrow needs more capacity. 〈\claim〉
〈reason〉 Heathrow runs at close to 100% capac-
ity. With demand for air travel predicted to double
in a generation, Heathrow will not be able to cope
without a third runway, say those in favour of the
plan. 〈\reason〉
〈reason〉 Because the airport is over-stretched,
any problems which arise cause knock-on delays.
Heathrow, the argument goes, needs extra capacity
if it is to reach the levels of service found at
competitors elsewhere in Europe, or it will be
overtaken by its rivals. 〈\reason〉
1http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7828694.stm
In the above tagging, we have a single claim, viz “Heathrow
needs more capacity”, and we have two reasons for this
claim. Hence, we appear to have two arguments. Each with
the same claim.
However, if we look at the second reason, we see that
there are nested arguments, and so we could deconstruct
the second paragraph as follows. The first sentence is an
argument containing a reason and claim as follows
〈reason〉 Because the airport is over-stretched
〈\reason〉, 〈claim〉 any problems which arise
cause knock-on delays. 〈\claim〉.
Then, we see that the above argument is itself a premise for
the following claim
〈claim〉 Heathrow, the argument goes, needs extra
capacity if it is to reach the levels of service found
at competitors elsewhere in Europe, or it will be
overtaken by its rivals. 〈\claim〉
Putting these observations together, we could tag the second
paragraph as follows where we have an argument as a nested
reason.
〈reason〉 〈reason〉 Because the airport is over-
stretched, any problems which arise cause knock-
on delays. 〈\reason〉 〈claim〉 Heathrow, the argu-
ment goes, needs extra capacity if it is to reach the
levels of service found at competitors elsewhere
in Europe, or it will be overtaken by its rivals.
〈\claim〉 〈\reason〉
So the final paragraph contains an argument (i.e. a reason
with claim), this argument is the reason for a claim within
the paragraph. Furthermore, the whole paragraph is a reason
for the claim in the title of the article.
Recently, there is growing interest in the computational
models of argument community and in the computational
linguistics community in mining arguments from texts (see
for example [9], [10], [16], [17], [22], [23], [26], [27], [28],
[29], [31], [33], [34]). An interesting challenge that is thus
arising is the choice of target formalism for representing the
extracted arguments. In computational models of argument,
abstract argumentation (as proposed by Dung [15]) and
logical or structured argumentation (as proposed in [6], [8],
[18], [25]) are the two key options. Neither is ideal as a
target formalism as we outline below.
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Abstract argumentation: Each argument is atomic. There
is no differentiation between reasons and claims. So there
is insufficient structure for a target language for argument
mining.
Logical argumentation: Each argument is a set of
formulae for premises, and a formula for a claim, where
the premises imply the claim using a given consequence
operator of a particular monotonic logic. So there is
excessive structure for a target language for argument
mining since natural language arguments are generally
enthymemes, that is some of their premises are unstated.
In previous work [2], we have proposed a formal language
for representing arguments. The language is made of formu-
lae of the form (−)R(y) : (−)C(x). The notation (−)R(y)
(resp. (−)C(x)) denotes that there are two cases: −R(y)
and R(y) (resp. −C(y) and C(y)). A formula R(y) : C(x)
stands for y gives reason to claim x, R(y) : −C(x) stands
for y gives reason for not claiming x, and −R(y) : C(x)
stands for y is not a reason for claiming x. The latter
form is called rejection of argument. The link between the
reason and the claim is left implicit. We have shown that
the language is general enough to capture a wide range of
types of arguments. In this paper, we extend the language
in such a way that the reason and/or the conclusion of an
argument can also be a combination of arguments. This al-
lows us to capture complex arguments like those conveyed in
recommendation letters. Consider a recommendation letter
written for someone who is applying for a position. The
main claim is that the candidate deserves the position and
the reason is a conjunction of several arguments, each of
which may be nested. Another contribution of the paper
consists of highlighting several forms of attacks and supports
between arguments, some of them have never been defined in
computational models of arguments. We show that each form
can be defined as a formula of the language. This allows
us to represent in a unified setting arguments and relations
between them. We show also what issues in (computational)
argumentation our formalism can address. In particular, we
deal with the details of applying our formalism in a range
of cases, discussing the significance of various forms of
arguments allowed in our formalism.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the language. Section III shows how to encode attacks and
supports between arguments as formulae of the language.
Section IV compares our formalism with computational
argumentation ones, and Section V describes briefly how
the language can be used as a target language for argument
mining. The last section concludes.
II. SYNTAX FOR RC FORMULAE
Our formalism for representing arguments is inspired by
Apothe´loz [5] and extends the one proposed in [2] for
representing nested arguments.
The formalism is built upon a classical propositional
language L(A) where A is a set of atoms. The formulae of
the language L(A) are defined in the usual way from A and
the usual classical operators ¬,∨,∧,→,↔. Our formalism
also uses two functions R(.) and C(.), a disjunction operator
|, a conjunction operator &, and an additional negation
operator −. Thus, two negation operators are needed: ¬ for
denying propositional formulas (¬x denotes that x is false),
and − for denying R(.) and C(.). Please note that ¬¬x is
identified with x and −−R(.) is identified with R(.) (also,
−− C(.) is identified with C(.)).
Definition 1 (RC formulae): The set of formulas
Arg(L(A)) is the smallest set such that a formula is of the
form (−)R(y) : (−)C(x) where x and y are formulae of
L(A)∪Arg(L(A)) or is a Boolean combination of formulae
of Arg(L(A)) with the connectives | and &.
The two operators | and & connect RC
formulae as follows: R(y) : C(x) | R(z) : C(t),
R(y) : C(x) & R(z) : C(t), R(y) : C(x) | −R(z) : C(t),
R(y) : C(x) & −R(z) : C(t), . . .
Remark: Please note that −((−)R(y) : (−)C(x)) is identi-
fied with −(−)R(y) : (−)C(x).
Each formula of Arg(L(A)) is either an argument or
a rejection of an argument. An argument is a reason for
concluding a claim. It has two main parts: premises (the
reason) and a conclusion. An argument is interpreted as
follows: its conclusion holds because it follows, according
to a given notion, from the premises. The notion refers to the
nature of the link (e.g., the premises cause the conclusion).
Definition 2 (Argument): An argument is a formula of
Arg(L(A)) of the form R(y) : (−)C(x).
The functions R and C play the roles of giving reason and
concluding, resp. They thus capture the coupling between a
reason and a conclusion. As we will see later, the contents
may be true while the functions do not hold and vice
versa. The intuitive meaning of the two formal expressions
captured by the previous definition is as follows:
R(y) : C(x) means that
“y is a reason for concluding x”
R(y) : −C(x) means that
“y is a reason for not concluding x”
The nature of the link between the reason and the conclusion
is captured by the colon. There are at least two reasons for
leaving the link implicit. First, natural language arguments
are generally enthymemes, thus some of their premises are
unstated. For instance, in the argument “Paul has DNA
because he is human”, there is a missing premise which
says “All humans have DNA”. Actually, it is not always
possible to make the link explicit. The second reason is
that there are several kinds of links, each of which leads
to a particular definition of arguments. In [4], it was shown
that arguments of types “threats” and “rewards” are defined
in an abductive way, while arguments of type “appeals to
prevailing practices” are deductive. Our purpose is to have
one general definition of argument in which all the different
types can be captured.
So far, the negation operator “−” has been used to deny
the concluding function. In what follows, the function of
giving reason can be denied as well by placing “−” in front
of R. What is denied in this case is not the premises but
rather the idea that the premises justify the conclusion of
the argument. Such a form is called rejection of argument
since it has exactly the opposite meaning of an argument.
Definition 3 (Rejection): A rejection of an argument is a
formula of Arg(L(A)) of the form −R(y) : (−)C(x).
The intuitive meaning for these formal expressions is as
follows:
Example 2: Assume the propositional atoms bird, pen-
guin, damaged.wing (to denote animals with a damaged
wing), slightly.damaged.wing (to denote animals with a
slightly damaged wing), and egg.laying (to denote animals
that lay eggs).
1) R(bird) : C(fly)
2) R(penguin) : C(¬fly)
3) R(bird ∧ damaged.wing) : −C(fly)
4) −R(bird ∧ slightly.damaged.wing) : −C(fly)
5) −R(egg.laying) : C(fly)
6) −R(egg.laying) : C(¬fly)
7) −R(egg.laying) : −C(fly)
Arguments can be counterarguments for other arguments.
For instance, R(bird) : C(fly) has R(penguin) : C(¬fly)
and R(bird ∧ damaged.wing) : −C(fly) as counterargu-
ments. We investigate the notion of a counterargument as
RC-formulae in the next section.
III. REPRESENTING ATTACK AND SUPPORT
In structured argumentation, an attack against a given
argument consists of presenting another argument denying
one of the components of the initial argument (i.e., premises,
conclusion, link). Thus, similar to a rejection, the aim of an
attack is to undermine an argument. The main difference
between the two lies in that the attacker provides a reason
for the attack. For instance, to undermine the conclusion x
of an argument R(y) : C(x), one should provide another
argument justifying why ¬x holds. In contrast, a rejection
needs no justification (but it may have one). Every attack
between two arguments leads to a rejection of the attacked
argument in the following way:
If R(z) : C(w) attacks R(y) : C(x),
then R(R(z) : C(w)) : C(−R(y) : C(x)).
Note that the converse is not true, rejections might not be
transformed into an attack between a pair of arguments.
Consider the following dialogue.
Paul: Why are you late? (la).
Carla: Because I am late R(la) : C(la)
Paul: This is not a reason −R(la) : C(la)
In the example, Paul rejects Carla’s argument without justi-
fying why. In fact, he denies the fact that the argument can
be circular.
We now turn to showing how to detect attacks between
mined arguments, and how the language can be used to
capture them within formulae of the language. Recall that
an argument R(y) : C(x) may be attacked on one of its
components: conclusion, premises, the link.
There are two ways for undermining the conclusion of
an argument: a strong way by showing that the negation of
the conclusion holds, and a weak way by showing that the
conclusion fails.
R(y) : C(x) R(z) : C(¬x)
R(R(z) : C(¬x)) : C(−R(y) : C(x))
(
Strong
Rebuttal
)
R(y) : C(x) R(z) : −C(x)
R(R(z) : −C(x)) : C(−R(y) : C(x))
(
Weak
Rebuttal
)
Strong Rebuttal corresponds to the well-known rebuttal in
existing argumentation formalisms.
Example 3: Illustration for strong rebuttal: Nixon is a
quaker (nq) and Nixon is a republican (nr). Is Nixon a
pacifist (np)?
R(nq) : C(np) R(nr) : C(¬np)
R(R(nr) : C(¬np)) : C(−R(nq) : C(np))
Weak rebuttal captures somehow the so-called undercut-
ting relation [24]. The basic idea is to block the application
of a defeasible rule in some cases. Let us consider the
following example:
Example 4: The object is red (re) because it looks red
(lr). This argument is written in our formalism as R(lr) :
C(re). In existing argumentation systems like ASPIC and
ASPIC+, the hidden assumption “Objects that look red are
indeed red” is encoded as a defeasible rule. If the object
is illuminated by red light (il), then undercutting amounts
to blocking the application of the rule, thus blocking its
conclusion re. In our language, this is simply written as
R(il) : −C(re). Unlike Example 3, the reason in the
counter-argument (il) needs not command that the negation
of the conclusion in the attacked argument (¬re) holds.
The premises of an argument may also be undermined in a
strong or a weak way as follows:
R(y) : C(x) R(z) : C(¬y)
R(R(z) : C(¬y)) : C(−R(y) : C(x))

 StrongPremise
Attack


R(y) : C(x) R(z) : −C(y)
R(R(z) : −C(y)) : C(−R(y) : C(x))

 WeakPremise
Attack


Strong Premise Attack amounts to the well-known
Assumption-Attack in argumentation literature.
Example 5: Illustration of strong premise attack: The
weather is good (gw) so the bbq will be a success (bs)
but weather reports predict rain (ra).
R(gw) : C(bs) R(ra) : C(¬gw)
R(R(ra) : C(¬gw)) : C(−R(gw) : C(bs))
The last component of an argument is the link between the
premises and the claim. As already said, the link concerns
the logical part of the argument, that is the inference pattern
that is used in order to infer the conclusion from the
premises. It can be denied in three ways as follows:
R(z) : C(−R(y) : C(x)) (Strong Reason Attack)
R(z) : −C(R(y) : C(x)) (Weak Reason Attack)
−R(y) : C(x) (Pure Reason Attack)
Example 6: Consider the following abductive argument.
If all dogs are mammals (dm), then all dogs are animals
(da). All dogs are animals. Therefore, all dogs are mammals.
This argument can be written as: R((dm → da) ∧ da) :
C(dm). Note that in spite of the premises and the conclusion
all being true, the argument is not valid. Indeed, it uses the
inference pattern
B if A then B
A
.
Of course, it may happen that A is false although B and if
A then B are true. In the same spirit, one may reject the
initial argument by means of a mere rejection −R((dm →
da) ∧ da) : C(dm). There are many circumstances where a
rejection can be justified, though. It would here be of the
form R(z) : C(−R((dm → da) ∧ da) : C(dm)) with z a
case making the previous pattern invalid (e.g. read da as
“David is annoyed” and dm as “David moans”, let z stand
for a situation where David is only slightly annoyed so that
da is not enough of a reason for dm).
Example 7: Consider the following argument. 90% of
humans are right-handed (hrh), therefore Paul is also right-
handed (prh). The argument, written as R(hrh) : C(prh),
might be rejected (−R(hrh) : C(prh)) because the link
between the premise hrh and the conclusion prh is invalid.
To sum up, with our logic of arguments, we can formalize
and manipulate attacks explicitly within the logic (which is
not possible in other formal systems of argumentation), and
we have a wider range of attacks than are considered in
other formal proposals for argumentation.
Unlike attacks which express negative links between argu-
ments, supports express positive links. In existing literature
(e.g., [12]), such links are captured by a binary relation
defined on the set of arguments. In our approach, such
an external relation is not needed since supports can be
expressed as formulae of the language. Let us now look at
various forms of support. An argument may support another
argument by approving one of its components: premises,
claim and link.
R(z) : C(y) R(y) : C(x)
R(R(z) : C(y)) : C(R(y) : C(x))
(
Premise
Support
)
R(z) : C(x) R(y) : C(x)
R(R(z) : C(x)) : C(R(y) : C(x))
(
Claim
Support
)
R(R(z) : C(t)) : C(R(y) : C(x)) (Reason Support)
R(z) : C(R(y) : C(x)) (Reason Support)
The first two relations have been presented in [11] but both
forms of link (reason) support are new.
Example 8: Consider the following dialogue.
Paul: Carl will pass his exams (pe). He is smart (sm).
R(sm) : C(pe)
John: He is moreover well prepared (wp).
R(wp) : C(pe)
John’s argument can also be interpreted in a sense to be
captured by the following argument: R(R(wp) : C(pe)) :
C(R(sm) : C(pe))
IV. COMPARISON
We have explained the language for our approach, and
we now turn to comparing it with existing approaches in
the literature.
A. Implicit representation of links
In almost all works on structured argumentation (e.g. [1],
[3], [6], [18], [25], [30]), an argument is a set of premises
that, using a notion of derivation, will lead to a conclusion
(see [20] for a comprehensive description of the derivations
used in the literature). As argued in the introduction, this
definition needs a logical representation of all the premises.
This is not viable for arguments mined from texts since they
are enthymemes (and therefore lack the explicit representa-
tion of premises and/or claim). Moreover, in general, existing
definitions capture only one type of argument (viz. deductive
arguments) while in text or dialogue, analogical arguments
are very common. Our approach captures enthymemes and
a wide variety of types of argument (such as abductive and
inductive).
B. Capturing links not relying upon inference
As mentioned above, in almost all works on structured
argumentation, an argument relies on a notion of derivation
linking the premises of the argument to its conclusion.
However, there arguably exist arguments that do not involve
an inference from premises to claim. An example is:
Smoking is a reason to get cancer.
Please observe that this is definitely an argument. Though,
there is no default rule to infer “getting cancer” from
“smoking”, not even a weighted default-like rule: It does
not seem right to express that smoking entails getting cancer
with likelihood x, whatever x in [0, 1].
In other words, such arguments fall outside the realm
of the existing approaches to structured argumentation.
Nonetheless, such an argument can be naturally expressed
in the RC-formalism as:
R(s) : C(gc)
where of course we use s to mean “smoking” and gc to
mean “getting cancer”.
C. Arguing explicitly about ignorance
In our approach, it is possible to argue explicitly about
ignorance. For instance, the RC-formula R(s) : −C(fe) can
represent the argument below:
Since Carl is very smart (s), we cannot conclude that
he will fail his exams (fe).
Some approaches to structured argumentation (e.g., [3],
[25]) prevent the conclusion fe from being deduced in an
indirect way, using Pollock’s undercutting [24] for blocking
the application of defeasibles rules as is illustrated next.
Example 9: Consider the facts F = {sm,¬wh}, the set
of strict rules S = {sm → n}, the set of defeasible rules
D = {¬wh → fe}, where fe denotes Carl will fail his
exams, wh denotes Carl worked hard, sm denotes Carl is
smart. Let n refer to the defeasible rule ¬wh → fe and
let n denote its non-application. So the strict rule sm → n
actually means that ¬wh→ fe does not apply in the context
of sm. The following four arguments can be built:
• a1 : (< sm >, sm)
• a2 : (< ¬wh >,¬wh)
• a3 : (< sm, sm→ n >, n)
• a4 : (< ¬wh,¬wh→ fe >, fe)
Argument a3 is a Pollock undercutting of a4. Using Pollock
undercutting as the attack relation, {a1, a2, a3} is the only
stable extension. So, the set of conclusions drawn from the
theory at hand is {sm,¬wh, n}. As expected, fe is not
inferred. There is however no argument expressing that sm
is the main reason for not having fe. While this approach is
worthwhile in reasoning, it is not natural in dialogues where
agents provide arguments for blocking conclusions. Our so-
lution (i.e., using an argument of the form R(sm) : −C(fe))
makes the connection explicit.
Instead of using a succinct formula such as R(y) : −C(x)
where x and y are propositions, structured argumentation
identifies two arguments A1 and A2 where the reason
(premises) of A1 includes x, and the claim of A2 is y.
Furthermore, for structured argumentation, the claim of A1,
and the premises of A2, need to be determined in order
to have the attack defined (which can be problematic when
they are not explicitly represented in the text or dialogue).
Consider the following argument:
Since Carl is at the university (u), he cannot conclude
whether his printer is delivered at home (de)
that can be represented simply by R(u) : −C(de) in
our approach. Contrastedly, in structured argumentation, not
even blocking the conclusion de is possible without further
information being available. In structured argumentation, not
only is there need for an argument A with some explicit
premises and claim de, but, in addition, a counterargument
B is needed that either attacks the premises of A′ or the
derivation of the claim de from those premises.
D. Complex arguments
Our approach supports the representation of nesting of
reasons. This means an argument or a rejection of an argu-
ment can be used as a reason or as a claim in an argument
or rejection of an argument. The premises and conclusion
can also be a conjunction or disjunction of arguments. This
provides a rich formalism for representing arguments and
rejections of arguments as arising in texts and dialogues.
DefLog [30] offers a language for representing arguments
that in some respects is similar to our Definition 2. It has
reasons and claims. These are atomic, or for claims, they
can be nested arguments. So unlike our approach, DefLog
does not support Boolean formulae as reasons or claims, and
DefLog does not support nested reasons. Also, DefLog does
not support rejections of arguments.
In [7], [21], abstract argumentation has been extended
with attacks on attacks, but this form of meta-argumentation
does not support differentiation of reasons and claims, and it
does not support rejection of arguments. Meta-argumentation
has also been proposed in logic-based approaches to ar-
gumentation (such as [19], [32]). These allow arguments
to appear in the premises or claims of other arguments.
However, these approaches assume explicit representation
of the logical formulae in the premises by which the claim
is derived, and they do not support rejection of arguments.
Also, they do not support arguing about ignorance.
E. Rejection of arguments
Our approach incorporates the representation of a rejec-
tion of an argument. This is different to a counterargument,
as we have argued in Section III. Approaches to structured
argumentation (such as [6], [8], [18], [25]) represent counter-
arguments, but there is no proposal that represents rejection
of arguments.
F. Explicit representation of attacks
Our approach represents rejections of arguments, which
are essential for representing diverse mined arguments. Con-
sequently, an attack is represented as an explicit construct
in the language. Attacks can also be justified (e.g. R(x) :
C(−R(y) : C(z)). As said before, no other logic-based
approach to modelling argumentation provides a language
for expressing rejection of arguments and attacks in the
object language.
A proposal for introducing support and attacks relations
into the language is E-DeLP [13], but the formalism only
allows reasons to support or to attack a claim, and the claim
can only be a defeasible rule. It therefore seems unlikely
to be a suitable target language for representing mined
arguments.
V. TARGET LANGUAGE FOR ARGUMENT MINING
Next we consider how our formalism can be used as a
target language for argument mining. Tagging is an impor-
tant step in developing a natural language processing system
(an NLP system). For this, we need to annotate a corpora
of items of text that we use for training an NLP system
(for instance based on statistical natural language processing
and/or machine learning). The aim is that after training, the
NLP system can automatically tag previously unseen items
of text (i.e. items of text not used for training) correctly.
Since there is often a subjective aspect to the tagging. each
of text is tagged by a number of people independently.
Example 10: We return to Example 1. We use the tag
x1 to tag a string in the title, we use the tags y1 and y2
to tag strings in the first paragraph, and we use the tags
z1, z2, and z3 to tag strings in the second paragraph. For
each tag p, 〈p〉 denotes the start of the string, and 〈\p〉
denotes the end of the string. From the following tagged
strings, we can obtained the RC-formulae R(y1) : C(x1)
and R(R(R(z1) : C(z2)) : C(z3)) : C(x1).
• 〈x1〉Heathrow needs more capacity〈\x1〉
• 〈y1〉Heathrow runs at close to 100% capacity. With
demand for air travel predicted to double in a genera-
tion, Heathrow will not be able to cope without a third
runway〈\y1〉, say those in favour of the plan.
• 〈z1〉Because the airport is over-stretched〈\z1〉, 〈z2〉any
problems which arise cause knock-on delays〈\z2〉.
〈z3〉Heathrow, the argument goes, needs extra capacity
if it is to reach the levels of service found at competitors
elsewhere in Europe, or it will be overtaken by its
rivals〈\z3〉.
So, as a target language, RC-formulae capture the connection
between reasons and claims, and as illustrated in Example
10, this connection can be nested. Furthermore, arguments
and rejections can be nested as reasons and claims.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper deals with the definition of a formalism for
representing natural language arguments. The formalism
provides a wide range of benefits including: (1) Target
language for arguments, mined from texts or dialogues, that
is between abstract and logical argumentation; (2) Represen-
tation of any type of arguments in a unified setting (threats,
rewards, examples, . . .); (3) Representation of arguments in
favour of ignorance; (4) Explicit representation of attacks
and supports in the object language; (5) Practical represen-
tation of enthymemes; (6) Representation of rejections; and
(7) Nesting and combinations of arguments and rejections.
This paper builds on a previous work [2] which it extends
in the following way. Whereas [2] focussed on the inference
system for RC-formulae, this paper deals with a number
of notions in argumentation that can be captured by our
approach and which facilitate the representation and reason-
ing with arguments as arising in AI applications involving
text and dialogue. Indeed, representation of attack and
support, nature of the reason-claim link and its underlying
requirements/conditions, ability to capture mere ignorance,
difference between rejections and counter-arguments, are all
topics in this paper that were not addressed in [2].
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